SPF: sender authorization
Defines which sending sources are authorized for the relevant envelope-sender or HELO identity. A published record does not prove a particular email passed SPF.
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Start free →Check your domain's MX, SPF and DMARC records, plus its DKIM public key when you provide a selector. Review published DNS configuration, understand reported issues and see what to check next.
Example report, not your domain
| Record | Status | Detail |
|---|---|---|
| SPF | PASS | Example: 1 record, 3 of 10 lookups |
| DKIM | PASS | Example: selector google, public key published |
| DMARC | WARNING | Example: p=none, monitoring only |
| MX | PASS | Example: 1 record found |
The checker reviews published DNS information used for email authentication and routing: SPF, DMARC and MX, plus DKIM when a selector is supplied or another supported discovery method returns a result.
Use the domain you want to check, such as example.com.
One successful result does not mean every other authentication or routing setting is correct.
Save changes at your authoritative DNS provider, allow for DNS caching, and check again.
Defines which sending sources are authorized for the relevant envelope-sender or HELO identity. A published record does not prove a particular email passed SPF.
Keys live at a selector-specific name, for example selector1._domainkey.example.com. A published key does not prove a message passed signature verification, and a failed selector lookup does not prove DKIM is absent for the domain. Find your selector in provider settings or the s= value of a DKIM-Signature header.
Connects successful SPF or DKIM authentication to the visible From domain through alignment. A DNS record shows published policy and settings, not whether a specific message passed DMARC.
Identifies the servers that receive email. Under RFC 5321 SMTP may fall back to an address record when no MX exists, and RFC 7505 Null MX explicitly says a domain accepts no mail. A missing MX needs context.
A timeout, resolver failure or restricted report is not a confirmed missing record. The result shows UNKNOWN, INCOMPLETE or NOT CHECKED instead of a pass or a zero.
When the checker supplies one, it summarizes the available checks. It is not an inbox-placement score, proof of message authentication or a guarantee of delivery.
Each record has a healthy signal and a warning sign. A timeout is not the same as a failure.
| Record | Healthy signal | Warning sign |
|---|---|---|
| SPF | One v=spf1 record, under 10 lookups | Multiple SPF records, or too many lookups |
| DKIM | A public key published at the selector you supplied | No key at that selector, or an empty p= tag |
| DMARC | A policy with a working reporting address | No record, or p=none treated as enforcement or as active reporting |
| MX | The routes you intend to use, or a Null MX if the domain accepts no mail | Stale routes after a migration |
| DNS lookups | Clear answers | A timeout, which should be rechecked rather than read as failure |
Two v=spf1 records at one name can cause a permanent error. Merge them into one.
DNS cannot list selectors, so you must supply the right one.
p=none is valid, but it requests no enforcement and needs a valid rua address for reports.
After a mailbox migration, remove routes to the old provider.
Authentication records confirm published configuration but do not guarantee inbox placement. Provider admin settings are authoritative over DNS results, and DNS changes may not appear everywhere at once because of caching. Use the dedicated SPF, DKIM, DMARC and MX tools when a result needs detailed investigation.
Focuses on SPF, DKIM, DMARC and MX.
Covers a broader set of supported domain diagnostics.
The next step for inspecting authentication and routing evidence from an actual email.
It looks up the DNS records used for email authentication and routing, usually SPF, DKIM, DMARC and MX, and shows what is published, weak or missing.
SPF lists authorized sending sources, DKIM publishes a signing key, DMARC sets policy and alignment with the visible From domain, and MX routes inbound mail.
Yes. DMARC needs at least one of them to align with the visible From domain, so a pass without alignment can still fail DMARC.
DNS cannot list every selector under a domain. The selector tells the checker exactly where to look for the public key, at selector._domainkey.yourdomain.com. Without one, DKIM is not checked.
No. It shows a public key is published. It does not prove that an actual message passed signature verification, and a failed selector lookup does not prove DKIM is absent for the domain.
Yes, but it requests no enforcement. Aggregate reports also need a valid reporting address, so p=none alone does not mean reporting is active.
One. Multiple SPF records at the same name can cause a permanent error.
SPF allows 10 DNS-querying terms. Includes and other mechanisms count toward the limit, including nested ones.
Not always. Under RFC 5321, SMTP may fall back to an address record when no MX exists, and RFC 7505 Null MX explicitly says a domain accepts no mail. A missing MX needs context.
A timeout, resolver failure or restricted report is not a confirmed missing record. Run the check again before changing DNS.
No. The score summarizes available checks only. Reputation, complaint rates, content and provider policies also matter.
The Email DNS Checker focuses on SPF, DKIM, DMARC and MX. The Domain Health Checker covers a broader set of supported domain diagnostics.
After DNS changes have propagated, which depends on your TTLs and caching, and after any provider or infrastructure change.
Healthy authentication protects your domain. Clean contacts protect your sender reputation. Cleaner outreach starts with better data.